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TEXAS CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES: THE ROLE OF THE JURY
AND THE RESTRAINING HAND OF THE EXPERT
PEGGY C. DAVIS*
It has been held that the level of our civilization
precludes imposition of the death penalty ivithout
an individualized judgment that it is "appropri-
ate".' Thus, "in capital cases the fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment ... requires consideration of the char-
acter and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a consti-
tutionally indispensable part of the process of in-
flicting the penalty of death.",2 It follows that cap-
ital sentencing procedures must "allow considera-
tion of particularized mitigating factors," for
[a] process that accords no significance to relevant
facets of the character and record of the individual
offender or the circumstances of the particular of-
fense excludes from consideration in fixing the ul-
timate punishment of death the possibility of com-
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the
diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a
faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the
blind infliction of the penalty of death.
4
Death sentences are imposed in Texas whenever
a jury determines that the defendant (a) was con-
victed of a capital crime committed deliberately
and unreasonably (in view of any provocation) and
(b) is dangerous.5 In Jurek v. Texas,6 the United
* Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of
Law at Newark. Research assistance was provided by
Norman Epting, a second year student at Rutgers-New-
ark School of Law.
'Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976). (Powell, Stevens & Stewart, J. J., plurality opin-
ion).2
id.
3 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976).
4 428 U.S. at 304.
5 (b) ... the court shall submit the following issues
to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would
result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the de-
fendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct
States Supreme Court considered the constitution-
ality of this sentencing scheme. The Court could
not approve a scheme, which sent to death all
persons guilty of deliberate and unreasonable cap-
ital crimes. (Indeed, it is arguable that all contem-
porary capital crimes, by Texas' definition or any
other, are deliberate and unreasonable.) 7 Further-
more, in a society which, by the use of an insanity
defense, protects many of its most dangerous mem-
bers even from judgments implying blameworthi-
ness, the Court apparently could not rule that the
finding of dangerousness necessarily took sufficient
account of "the character and record of the of-
fender"8 to qualify as an individuating judgment
that the death penalty was "appropriate. " 9 It was
able, however, to uphold the Texas statute on the
theory that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
had construed the dangerousness question such
that the defendant could bring to the jury's atten-
tion whatever mitigating circumstances he could
show. The Court recognized that:
In determining the likelihood that the defendant
would be a continuing threat to society, the jury
could consider whether the defendant had a signifi-
cant criminal record. It could consider the range
and severity of his prior criminal conduct. It could
further look to the age of the defendant and whether
or not at the time of the commission of the offense
he was acting under duress or under the domination
of another. It could also consider whether the de-
fendant was under an extreme form of mental or
emotional pressure, something less, perhaps, than
insanity, but more than the emotions of the average
man, however inflamed, could withstand.'o
of the defendant in killing the deceased was unrea-
sonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased....
(f) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on
each issue submitted under this article, the court
shall sentence the defendant to death.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp.
1978).
6 428 U.S. 262.
7 See BLACK, CAPrITAL PUNISHMENT: Tl-E INEVI rA-
BI.rrY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 57-62 (1974).
8 428 U.S. at 287 n.7.
9 Id. at 304.
to428 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting Jurek v. State, 522
S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
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The determination of dangerousness therefore
developed a mixed use: it was to satisfy the legis-
lative requirement that only dangerous offenders
be executed, and it was to satisfy the constitutional
requirement that the sentencing decision involve
"consideration of particularized mitigating.circum-
stances.""
Since the jury is to consider "whatever mitigat-
ing circumstances [the defendant] may be able to
show, ' 12 we must assume that it may act upon
mitigating evidence which is neutral or positive on
the question of future dangerousness. To assert the
contrary, one must be willing in effect to preclude
individualized judgments and to preordain execu-
tion of any capital offender who does not appear
innocuous.13 There is an irresistible speculation
that the mixed use is forced and that only a forth-
right granting of authority to preclude execution
on the basis of mitigating evidence will meet the
constitutional need. Nonetheless, if the Jurek
Court's refusal to approve the Texas statute on its
face and its commitment to particularized capital
sentencing judgments are to have meaning, we
must assume that the dangerousness determination
affords flexibility. We must assume that danger-
ousness is a relative concept, better understood
perhaps by the phrase "intolerable threat," so that
mitigating evidence might lead a jury to find the
risk of declining to execute acceptable to a humane
and advanced society.
14
If this flexibility is necessary to the constitution-
ality of the statute, there is danger in any practice
which inhibits the jury from voting consistently
with its ethical and social judgment. The delega-
tion to psychiatric experts of the function of deter-
mining dangerousness is such a practice.
A DESCRIPTION OF THE PRACTICE
In its decision upholding the Texas statute, the
Jurek Court noted that the highest criminal court
of Texas had, in Smith v. State,'5 based affirmance
of a death sentence upon factors revealed during
the trial and "the conclusion of a psychiatrist that
he [the defendant] had a sociopathic personality
" Id at 272.
12 Id.
13 Statutory and case law leave it altogether unclear
how dangerous an offender must be before execution is
permissible under art. 37.071 (b) (2) of the Texas statute.
See discussion at notes 30-41 and accompanying text
infra.
4 The alternative notion that the presentation of mit-
igating evidence is to invite jury nullification presents its
own constitutional problems, See 428 U.S. at 302-03.
" 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976).
and that his patierns of conduct would be the same
in the future as they had been in the past."'6
Analysis of capital cases reviewed by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals suggests-that the State
frequently introduces psychiatric evidence at the
penalty phase of a capital trial, 7 and that the
expert typically presents a diagnosis of sociopath'8
or an equivalent term' 9 and an unqualified char-
acterization of dangerousness. 20 Particular experts
appear to testify regularly for the State in these
matters. 2' The psychiatric evidence at times con-
16 428 U.S. at 273. Smith was a non-triggerman in a
robbery convicted under the felony murder rule. He had
been intermittently unemployed since a conviction for
marijuana possession, which had been his first offense.
There was evidence that he did, and evidence that he did
not, attempt to kill the victim himself. For full accounts
of the case, see Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness,"
Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 Am. J. GRIM.
L. 151, 153-68 (1977); Black, Due Processfor Death: Jurek
v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 GAutii. U. L. Ri-v. 1,
14-16 (1976). Smith's death sentence was vacated by a
federal district court on the grounds that he was denied
due process, effective assistance of counsel, the right to
present evidence and the right not to incriminate himself
by circumstances surrounding the presentation of psychi-
atric testimony at the sentencing hearing. Smith v. Es-
telle, No. CA 3-77-0544-F, sl (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 1977).
'7 Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 253 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 114 (Tex.
Grim. App. 1977); Battie v. State, 551 S.W.2d 401,
406-07 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977); Moore v. State, 542
S.W.2d 664, 675-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Livingston
v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655,661-62 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976);
Gholsorf v. State, 542 S.W.2d 395, 399-401 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1976); Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex.
Grim. App. 1976).
18 Battie v. State, 551 S.W.2d at 407; Moore v. State,
542 S.W.2d at 676; Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d at
661; Gholson v. State, 542 S.W.2d at 399; Smith v. State,
540 S.W.2d at 696.
' Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d at 123 (antisocial
personality).
20 In Shippy the psychiatric expert was unable to assert
"a reasonable medical probability" of dangerousness. 556
S.W.2d at 256. However, in Moore, the defendant was
termed "an absolute threat," 542 S.W.2d at 676; in
Livingston the testimony was that the defendant "would
remain a continuing threat to society," 542 S.W.2d at
661; and in Gholson the experts' conclusion was that both
defendants "would continue to be a danger to society,"
542 S.W.2d at 399.
2' Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d at 114 (Dr. Holbrook);
Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d at 676 (Drs. Grigson and
Holbrook); Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d at 661 (Drs.
Grigson and Holbrook); Gholson v. State, 542 S.W.2d at
399-400 (Drs. Grigson and Holbrook); Smith v. State,
540 S.W.2d at 696 (Dr. Grigson).
Even before the enactment of the present Texas capital
sentencing procedure with its requirement that the jury
determine dangerousness, the State had used Dr. Grig-
son's testimony that the defendant was a sociopath with
19781
stitutes the State's entire presentation at sentenc-
ing.22 Prior convictions are, of course, introduced,
and on occasion testimony is presented that the
defendant's reputation for being a peaceable and
law abiding citizen is "bad.2''
There is no indication in the appellate opinions
that defense counsel in capital cases have made use
of psychiatric experts at the penalty phase, but the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has reversed a
capital conviction for the trial judge's failure to
permit the defense to present a psychiatric wit-
ness.24 There is evidence that the resources of the
defense are so limited that the use of such evidence
might be foreclosed.25 The introduction of other
kinds of mitigating evidence may also be signifi-
cantly limited. For example, as the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals held in Hovila v. State, the statute
"allows a trial judge broad discretion in determin-
ing just what constitutes 'relevant [and therefore
"no regard for societal rules, familial rules, moral rules
and legal rules" and could not be rehabilitated, to influ-
ence a jury sentencing decision. The testimony was of-
fered to counter testimony at the penalty hearing by
defendant's mother and sister that they thought he could
be rehabilitated. The jury sentenced him to death. Arm-
strong v. State, 502 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. Grim. App.
1973). In Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1976),
a homicide conviction, upheld in the district court by
reliance upon the testimony of Dr. Grigson that the
defendant was a sociopath and had been competent to
stand trial, was reversed. The circuit court declared the
"finding that Bruce is a sociopath clearly erroneous" and
noted:
Except for Dr. Grigson, all the physicians who
examined Bruce detected an underlying schizo-
phrenic disorder.... [T]he only dissenting expert,
Dr. Grigson, conducted his first examination three
and one-half years after trial.... Nor did Dr. Grig-
son keep Bruce under lengthy observation....
When asked how it was possible that the other
experts who had examined Bruce over a nine-year
period had arrived at a radically different diagnosis,
Dr. Grigson's sole explanation was that he was
better qualified than they to determine Bruce's
condition, a fact not established in the record.
Id. at 1060-61.
2 Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d at 676; Livingston v.
State, 542 S.W.2d at 663.
2 Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d at 256; see Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. at 267.
24 Robinson v. State. 548 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1977) ("Testimony to the contrary on behalf of the
State has been held admissible at the punishment stage
of the trial. A good rule of evidence works both ways.").
25 Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287, 303 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1977) (upholding a 8500 expense limit for investi-
gation and e,:perti in the case of a defendant charged
with two counts of capital murder).
admissible] evidence' at the punishment stage.""
In upholding the Texas statute, the Supreme
Court in Jurek seemed to rely upon the ability of
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to provide,
by a process of review, "a means to promote the
evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of
death sentences under law."2 7 However, the suffi-
ciency of the evidence supporting a death sentence
has been reviewed only in those cases in which the
issue has been raised by counsels and the evidence
has never been found wanting. More than ten
capital convictions have been affirmed with only
cursory appellate review of the issue.2s These results
have occurred even though members of the court
have twice expressed the view that findings of
dangerousness may not rest exclusively upon psy-
chiatric evidence of the kind typically offered by
the state,s3 and Judge Phillips has announced his
belief that a review of the sufficiency of the evi-
26 Hovila v. State, No. 56,989, slip op. at 9 (Tex. Grim.
App. Feb. 8, 1978) (quoting Robinson v. State, 548
S.W.2d at 65). Hovila's death sentence was affirmed
despite the trial judge's refusal to permit his mother to
testify that after his mistaken release from custody pend-
ing trial he had returned to her home and had stayed out
of trouble and that four days later "when he discovered
his release was a mistake he returned to Dallas with the
intention of surrendering to the authorities." Id.
The evidence ... that Hovila did not murder or
commit other criminal acts during a four-day period
would not show that he probably would or would
not be a continuing threat to society-the trial
court's error, if any, in refusing to admit this evi-
dence was not so harmful as to require us to reverse.
Id. at 10.
2'428 U.S. at 276.
28 Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 256 (rex. Grim.
App. 1977); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270, 281 (Tex.
Grim. App. 1977); Brock v. State, 556 S.W.2d 309, 317
(Tex. Grim. App. 1977); Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d
107, 123 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977); Smith v. State, 540
S.W.2d 693, 696 (rex. Grim. App. 1977); Moore v. State,
542 S.W.2d 664, 676 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976).
2 These include Denney v. State, 558 S.W.2d 467
(Tex. Grim. App. 1977); Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d
287 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977); King v. State, 553 S.W.2d
105 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977); Battie v. State, 551 S.W.2d
401 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977); Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d
368 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977); White v. State, 543 S.W.2d
104 (Tex. Grim. App. 1977); Woodkins v. State, 542
S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976); Boulware v. State,
542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976); Livingston v.
State, 542 S.W.2d 655 (rex. Grim. App. 1976); Gholson
v. State, 542 S.W.2d 395 (rex. Grim. App. 1976).
30 Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d at 663 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting). See also Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d at 693
(Odom, J., dissenting), withdrawn before publication,
reproduced in part in Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerous-
ness," Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J.
GRIM. L. 151, 163-65.
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dence supporting a death sentence is constitution-
ally required. 1
The Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to
-refine the rather vague statutory language setting
forth the concept of dangerousness. Instead, the
jury is typically asked to determine "whether there
is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society. ' 32 For instance, in
King v. Statess the court was asked to set aside a
death sentence for the trial judge's refusal to define
the terms "deliberately," "probability," "'criminal
acts of violence," and "continuing threat to soci-
ety."'' The court noted that "the definition of
common terms and phrases" is not required in a
charge to the jury and that "[i]nJurek v. Texas ....
the Supreme Court of the United States concluded
that the submission of the issues provided by Art.
37.071, supra, constitutionally guided the jury's
determination of the punishment issues. No special
definitions of the terms of that statute were re-
quired.' ' as The court therefore held "that [it] ...
need not provide special definitions for these terms
in its charge to the jury during the punishment
stage of a capital murder trial. ' ' a6 The court had
held similarly with regard to the term "probabil-
ity" and defined it as follows:
"Likelihood" is one of the definitions for "probabil-
ity" in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 2d Ed.
(1948). Other definitions of the word probability
include "reasonable ground for presuming," "true,
real, or likely to occur," "a conclusion that is not
proof but follows logically from such evidence as is
available," [and] "in the doctrine of chance, the
likelihood of the occurrence of any particular form
of an event."37
31 King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105, 108 (rex. Crim.
App. 1977) (Phillips, J., concurring). Judge Phillips re-
viewed the evidence here and found it sufficient; he has
not conducted such a review in subsequent capital cases
affirmed by the court.
32TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071 (b) (2)
(Vernon Supp. 1978).




3 Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d at 117 n.6. The failure
to iarrow these terms presents independent constitu-
tional problems. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has noted that "when a deter-
mination of 'dangerousness' will result in a deprivation
of liberty, no court can afford to ignore the very real
constitutional problems surrounding incarceration pred-
icated only upon a supposed propensity to commit crim-
inal acts." Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (emphasis added). The court found it necessary to'
Relying upon the Kingjudgment that the language
of the statute is "simple" and uses terms the jury is
"supposed to know,' 38 the Texas court has held
that the defense has no right to inform its judgment
regarding the use of peremptory challenges by
asking prospective jurors such questions as whether
they would deem a crime against property an "act
of violence.,
39
The jury which must decide the dangerousness
question, and with it the fate of the capital defend-
ant, is purged of individuals unable to swear that
"the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment
for life will not affect [their] deliberations on any
issue of fact." ° It is, then, to a jury sworn to
dispassionate objectivity that the medical expert
presents testimony that the defendant is a socio-
path and the ominous conclusion that he will
"constitute a continuing threat to society."
This expert testimony is suspect on three
grounds. First, mental health professionals are no-
toriously bad at predicting dangerousness and in-
variably err on the side of overinclusion. 5 Al-
construe a statute requiring commitment of dangerous
sex offenders to "provide an analytical framework to
guide lower courts in applying the conclusory term 'dan-
gerous to others'." For,
[w]ithout some such framework, "dangerous" could
readily become a term of art describing anyone
whom we would, all things considered, prefer not to
encounter on the streets. We did not suppose that
Congress had used "dangerous" in any such Pick-
wickian sense. Rather, we supposed that Congress
intended the courts to refine the unavoidably vague
concept of "dangerousness" on a case-by-case basis,
in the traditional common-law fashion.
Ia at 1099.
38 Battie v. State, 551 S.W.2d at 404.
9 I at 405.
"°TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.31 (Vernon
1974). The Court of Criminal Appeals regards inability
to take this oath an independent ground for exclusion of
a prospective juror. This would seem to violate the prin-
ciple, established in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968), that exclusion of a juror opposed to the death
penalty is constitutionally impermissible absent an un-
mistakably clear expression of an inability to follow the
law. Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d at 297; Bums v. State,
556 S.W.2d at 275-79; Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d at
251; Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d at 667-72.
"'The evidence is reviewed in SrONE, MENTAL
HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSfrION 25-40'
(1975), with the conclusion that "[t]he mental health
professionals ... simply have no demonstrated capacity
to generate even a cutting line that will confine more
true than false positives." Ia at 33. See also Ennis &
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974);
Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDuC. 24 (1970).
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though it has seemed a necessity in the mainte-
nance of a system of involuntary mental health
care, and a reasonable incident to the multidimen-
sional process of making sen tencing decisions in
non-capital cases, psychiatric prediction of danger-
ousness is conceded to be highly unreliable by
virtually every student of the problem. And, while
the point has been made frequently and conclu-
sively, the concessions of several mental health
professionals bear repeating. It is admitted that
"the longer one works in [the mental health]"field,
the more one is impressed with the problem of
deciding the question of danger. ... ,,42
It is also conceded that:
We cannot predict even with reasonable certainty
that an individual will be dangerous to himself or
to others. Thus the question as to what extent we
can exercise control over dangerous individuals
must be considered .... We can make an educated
guess, but what right does society have to act upon
a guess?3
[W]e need to examine the important ethical prob-
lems that are a direct result of the present level of
knowledge in identification of violence-prone indi-
viduals. Concern about violence will inevitably lead
to the development of special treatment programs,
but the majority of persons placed in such programs
must be false positives .... Confidence in the ability
to predict violence serves to legitimate intrusive
types. of social control. Our demonstration of the
futility of such prediction should have consequences
as great for the protection of individual liberty as a
demonstration of the utility of violence prediction
would have for the protection of society.44
There can be little doubt that "[t]hejudge or juror
who relies on the opinion of the expert [on the
question of dangerousness] acts less rationally than
he thinks he does. Actually he relies on ajudgment
into which personal insights and experiences are
bound to enter so importantly that it cannot be
called scientific.
45
The difficulty with the expert testimony pre-
sented in the Texas capital sentencing proceeding
is that the sociopath 46 diagnosis is the most contro-
4
1Johnston, Releasing the Dangerous Offender, in THE
CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF
THE MENTALLY ILL 29, 34 (J. Rappeport ed. 1967).
4 Usdin, Broader Aspects of Dangerousness, in Rappeport,
supra note 42, at 43.
" Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?,
18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393, 402 (1972).
van der Kvast, Can the Psychiatrist Foretell Criminal
Behavior?, 20 INT'L. J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIM. 148, 151 (1976).
46 The terms sociopath, psychopath and antisocial per-
sonality are used interchangeably in psychiatric and psy-
versial and perhaps the least precise in psychiatric
nomenclature.
The term "psychopath" is probably the most abused
word in the whole psychiatric vocabulary. Etymo-
logically, the word itself is nonspecific; it merely
means a sick mind. Such ambiguous terms are
readily subject to misuse. When a vague term is
employed, it usually means that the concept which
it represents is vague, and, unfortunately, this is
true of psychopathy.
47
There are some who think the term without
scientific meaning and many who think it exces-
sively and irresponsibly used.49 The following char-
acteristics were identified by Cleckley and are, with
chological journals and will here be deemed to have the
same referent.
47 M. GU-I-rMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN. PSYCHIAIRY
AND THE LAW 86 (1952).
" "[D]oubts are frequently expressed as to whether the
concept has a substantive referent." Blackburn, An Em-
pirical Classification of Psychopathic Personality, 127 BRrI. J.
PSYCH. 456 (1975). Blackburn concluded, however, after
empirical study, that the convergence of traits usually
attributed to the sociopath occurred with sufficient fre-
quency to justify use of the term. Id. at 460. Robins called
the diagnosis a "psychiatric wastebasket," but, in the
view of Lewis and Balla, "[ignored] his own warning,
[and] proceeded to conceptualize 'an illness or syndrome'
that included such a variety of behaviors... as to become
meaningless." Lewis & Balla, "Sociopathy" andIts Symptoms:
Inappropriate Diagnoses in Child Psychiatry, 132 AM. J.
PSYCH. 720 (1975).
A minority has maintained that the psychopathic
personality, as a distinct clinical syndrome, does not
exist. One of these dissenters, psychiatrist Olof Kin-
berg, commented ... "[the concept] should be ab-
rogated as theoretically unsatisfactory, practically
misleading and destructive to scientific thinking."
And Dr. Leo Kanner has commented, "A psycho-
path is somebody you don't like."
W. MCCORD & J. MCCORD, THE PSYCHOPxrH 2 (1964)
(citations omitted).
[A] substantial number of psychiatrists do not be-
lieve there is any such condition. Many other clini-
cal psychologists who, somewhat reluctantly, rec-
ognize its existence, nevertheless regard the psycho-
pathic group as a dumping ground for unclassified
mental disorders. Psycho-analysts view the term
with an equally jaundiced eye, and indeed rarely
use it, preferring their own characterological no-
menclature, which however is... far from adequate.
Even forensic psychiatrists ... although readiest of
all to accept the term, are not agreed as to its exact
connotation.
E. GLOVER, THE RooTrs OF CRIME 118 (1960).49 
See, e.g., W. MCCORD & J. MCCORD, supra note 48,
at 20; Blackburn, supra note 48, at 456; Lewis & Balla,
supra note 48, at 720; S. HALLECK. PSYCHIAIRY AND
THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 101 (1967).
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variations among investigators, commonly associ-
ated with sociopathy:
1. Superficial charm and good "intelligence."
2. Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational
"thinking."
3. Absence of "nervousness" or psychoneurotic mar-
ifestations.
4. Unreliability.
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity.
6. Lack of remorse or shame.
7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior.
8. Poorjudgment and failure to learn by experience.
9. Pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love.
10. General poverty in major affective reactions.
11. Specific loss of insight.
12. Unresponsiveness in general interpersonal rela-
tions.
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior with drink and
sometimes without.
14. Suicide rarely carried out.
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated.
16. Failure to follow any life plan.' °
There is strong disagreement as to whether the
term identifies a discreet clinical state or a tendency
toward a mode of acting out conflicts common to
a range of personality types.5' The absence of a
50 H. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY 355-56 (1950
ed.) The classification accepted by the American Psychi-
atric Association is:
"Antisocial personality.
This term is reserved for individuals who are basi-
cally unsocialized and whose behavior pattern
brings them repeatedly into conflict with society.
They are incapable of significant loyalty to individ-
uals, groups, or social values. They are grossly
selfish, callous, irresponsible, impulsive, and unable
to feel guilt or to learn from experience and punish,
ment. Frustration tolerance is low. They tend to
blame others or offer plausible rationalizations for
their behavior. A mere history ofrepeated legal or
social offenses is not sufficient to justify this diag-
nosis. Group delinquent reaction of childhood (or adoles-
cence) (q.v.), and Social maladjustment without manifest
psychiatric disorder (q.v.) should be ruled out before
making this diagnosis."
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 43
(1968).
'5 In current literature the term "psychopathy" is
defined vaguely and because of arbitrary usage
tends to assume multiple meanings.... [T]wo major
usages predominate. There are those persons who
would agree ... that psychopathy is a personality
disorder, a discernible clinical entity which can be
isolated from other disorders and which is clearly
diagnosable. There are others who see ... psycho-
pathy as a hypothetical rather than an absolute
condition. They would view psychopathy as a re-
satisfactory or agreed upon clinical definition or an
identifiable intrapsychic dynamic has led research-
ers to "classify" sociopaths in terms of their behav-
ior,52 with the result that frequently the classifica-
tion either explains nothing or sweeps too broadly.
On the other hand, objective classification systems
which attempt to take account of things other than
behavior are demonstrably unreliable.5
The causes of sociopathy are also disputed. The
onset of the disorder tends to occur between the
ages often and thirteen. Yet, rejection, emotional
starvation and parental hostility in the first or first
three years of life have been advanced as its
causes,a5 as have early institutionalization,6 incon-
sistent parental responses57 and defective neurolog-
ical structures.s
The strong correlation between parental rejec-
tion and the sociopath diagnosis makes plausible
the dynamic hypothesis that the sociopath is an
individual engaged in a "search for a painless
sponse to the same kinds of conflicts that produce
neurosis but would recognize that some individuals
have a tendency to develop hypertrophied alloplas-
tic behavioral patterns. Psychiatrists who support
this proposition argue that one does not see real
psychopaths, only individuals who are more or less
psychopathic.
S. HALLECK, supra note 49 at 101.
52 See, e.g., Campagna & Harter, Moral Judgment in
Sociopathic and Normal Children, 31 J. PERSONALrIY & Soc.
PSYCH. 199, 200 (1973). Cf W. McCORD &J. MCCORD,
supra note 48, at 44, on the problem of diagnosis ("the
observer should possess more than the usual amount of
knowledge of his patient; he cannot depend, as with
many other disorders, on the overt behavior symptoms,
or complaints of the subject at the time of contact").
5 Psychological testing of adolescent delinquents and
volunteers (ministers, psychologists, social workers, cor-
rection officers, psychiatric residents and graduate stu-
dents) in a mental health collective identified more than
fifty percent of each group as psychopathic. Hawk & Peter-
son, Do MMPI Psychopathic Deviancy Scores Reflect Psycho-
pathic Deviancy or Just Deviancy?, 138 J. PERSONALITY
AsSESSMENT 362 (1974).
54 Campagna & Harter, supra note 52, at 200.
6s W. MCCORD & J. McCORD, supra note 48, at 83;
H. Gut-rMACHER & M. WEIHOFEN, supra note 47, at
107-08.
'0 Humphrey, A Study of the Etiology of Sociopathic Behav-
ior, 35 DISESES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTrEM 432 (1974).
' Campagna & Harter, supra note 52, at203.
58 W. MCCORD & J. MCCORD, supra note 46, at 70
("more psychopaths seem to have defective neural struc-
tures than would be expected in a normal population,
and it seems likely that such defects have some causative
importance"). Recent research has focused upon the
possibility of atypical responses to stimuli which.preclude
or inhibit avoidance learning. See SCIACH'rER. EMO-
TION. OaEsrY AND CRIME 152-83 (1971).
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freedom from object relations" which serves as "a
defense against the intolerable experience of help-
lessness."5 Nevertheless, no explanation of the con-
vergence of symptoms has won a concensus. In
sum, the diagnosis tells us little more than that a
subject exhibits, for unknown reasons, a cluster of
characteristics which may or may not suggest an
identifiable intrapsychic dynamic.
The third difficulty involved in the use of psy-
chiatric testimony indicating that a Texas capital
defendant is a sociopath is that despite the fact
that the criminal or antisocial conduct is seen as
an identifying symptom of sociopathy, there is,
surprisingly, no reason to hope that pyschiatric
predictions of dangerousness will be significantly
more reliable within the universe of persons diag-
nosed as sociopaths. Whether because the diagnosis
is meaningless, 60 or difficult to make,6 1 or broader
than the behaviorist referent, 62 it does not permit
5 S. HALLECK. supra note 49, at 103-04. A clinical
example is presented in which a sociopath recalls that at
the age of nine, abandoned by his father, he was helpless
to avoid being left alone for long periods by his mother.
He thought of pleading with his mother, and stated:
Then suddenly it came to me that no matter what
I did, no matter how much I cried or pleaded, it
wouldn't make any difference, she would leave
anyway. At that moment somehow or another, I
was a free person. I didn't need her and I didn't
need anybody. I stopped worrying and I started
having fun. Since that time life has been easy, and
I can be happy even though I am in prison.
Id. at 105.
60 See note 48, supra.
6' See notes 49-53, supra and accompanying text.
62 Halleck and others maintain that "the psychopath
is not necessarily a criminal. He certainly need not be an
unsuccessful criminal. If a really pure psychopath could
exist, his success in the world would probably preclude
his ever coming to the attention of a psychiatrist." S.
HALLECK, supra note 49, at 101. Indeed, criminal or
violent acting out is seen as a failure of the defense. Id. at
108-14. Cleckley recognizes in some apparent sociopaths
an ability to commit, and sometimes repeat, violent,
antisocial acts, but finds such conduct so atypical as to
warrant modification of the diagnosis:
The [typical] psychopath, as I have seen him, usu-
ally does not commit murder or other offenses that
promptly lead to major prison sentences. This is
true of the disorder as I present it in what I consider
a pure culture. A large part of his antisocial activity
might be interpreted as purposively designed to
harm himself if one notices the painful results that
so quickly overtake him. Of course I am aware of
the fact that [many] persons showing the character-
istics of those here described do commit major
crimes and sometimes crimes of maximal violence.
There are so many, however, who do not, that such
tendencies should be regarded as the exception
rather than as the rule, perhaps, as a pathologic
a reliable prediction of dangerousness.
A search of the literature reveals only one study
of the dangerousness of severe sociopaths. All of the
sociopaths in this study had been convicted of at
least one crime, and all had been diagnosed pri-
mary psychopaths. One quarter were convicted of
no additional crimes during a fifteen year follow-
up:
For some 15 years we ... have followed the subse-
quent convictions of 70 prisoners ... who were
picked out as undoubted examples of psychopathic
personality of a severe grade. We have compared
them with nonpsychopathic prisoners. Although
most of them have became very serious recidivists
and have been in prison for much of the time, a
quarter of them, to our surprise, have never been
reconvicted. In the last 5 years of the 15 follow-up,
just completed, the psychopaths who have been at
liberty during this period have hardly been recon-
victed more often than a control group.63
The ability of psychiatrists to predict serious as-
saultive crimes among offenders who had committed
at least one criminal act and fit identical with the
"classical stereotype of the criminal or antisocial
psychopath,"' has been tested in an effort in Mas-
sachusetts to identify and treat dangerous sex of-
fenders.65 Of the thirty patients found to be dan-
gerous after thirty months of treatment and eval-
uation," less than thirty percent committed serious
assaultive crimes.
6 7
If psychiatric experts in Texas capital sentencing
proceedings believe, as they seem to,6 that all
"severe" sociopaths are dangerous, they may, then,
overpredict simple recidivism in one out of four
cases. If they were to conduct extensive analyses,
trait independent, to a considerable degree, of the
other manifestations which we regard as fundamen-
tal.
H. CLECKLEY. supra note 50, at 290. The task of identify-
ing an independent pathologic trait leading to violent
behavior may be no easier when the subject is a diagnosed
sociopath than when he is not.
63 Gibbens, Briscoe & Dell, Psychopathic and Neurotic
Offenders in Mental Hospitals, in THE MENTALLY ABNOR-
MAL OFFENDER 143-44 (de Reuck & Porter eds. 1968).
64 Kozol, Baucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treat-
ment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371,
379 (1972).
6 Kozol, Baucher and Garofalo, supra note 64.
6 Evaluations were by a team including psychiatrists,
psychologists and a social worker and drew upon "clinical
examinations, psychological tests, and a meticulous re-
construction of the life history elicited from multiple
sources." Id. at 383.
6Id. at 391.
68 See Dix, supra note 16, at 157.
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and they do not,69 they might overpredict serious
assaultive behavior by as much as seventy percent.
Yet, their pronouncement that there is a probabil-
ity that the defendant will commit future acts of
violence because he is a sociopath must skew the
sentencing process away from a balancing judg-
ment reflecting contemporary morality and toward
a rigid process of classification. Analogous conflicts
between the factfinder's tendency to label at the
direction of psychiatric experts and its duty to
make an independent judgment are instructive.
LESSONS FROM ANALOGOUS USES OF
PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE
The moral, social and legal judgment made by
a jury deciding the appropriateness of a death
sentence is much like that of a jury deciding the
culpability of a defendant who raises an insanity
defense. Here too the psychiatric expert may in-
hibit jury deliberation:
With the relevant information about the defendant,
and guided by the legal principles enunciated by
the court, the jury must decide, in effect, whether
or not the defendant is blameworthy. Undoubtedly,
the decision is often painfully difficult, and perhaps
its very difficulty accounts for the readiness with
which we have encouraged the expert to decide the
question. But our society has chosen not to give this
decision to psychiatrists or to any other professional
elite but rather to twelve lay representatives of the
community.70
It has been determined that "in view of the com-
plicated nature of the decision to be
made-intertwining moral, legal and medical
judgments-the insanity defense is peculiarly apt
for resolution by the jury."71 And, .it has been
required "that trial judges and appellate judges
ensure that the jury base its decision on the behav-
ioral data which are relevant to a determination of
blameworthiness,"' rather than the conclusions
and classifications of experts. Psychiatric experts
have therefore been discouraged from stating a
simple conclusion as to whether an illeged crime
was.a product of a mental disease or defect where
that determination is essential to a determination
of insanity.73 They have been asked instead to give
69See Dix, id, at 155, 159; Battie v. State, 551 S.W.2d
at 407.
"oWashington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 453-54
(D.C. Cir. 1967).7 1Adams v. United States, 413 F.2d 411, 416 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (quoting King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383,
389 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
' Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d at 447.
73 Id. at 455-56.
"the kind of opinion you would give to a family
which brought one of its members to your clinic
and asked for your diagnosis of his mental condi-
tion and a description of how his condition would
be likely to influence his conduct."74 It has also
been required that the charge to the jury admonish
it against excessive reliance upon the expert's con-
clusions. 5
Conclusory psychiatric testimony has also been
found to inhibit intelligent decision-making where
civil commitment is authorized for the dangerous.
In words that ring truer, perhaps, in this context
than in that for which they were written, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has said:
It is particularly important that courts not allow
this second question to devolve, by default, upon
the expert witnesses. Psychiatrists should not be
asked to testify, without more, simply whether fu-
ture behavior or-threatened harm is "likely" to
occur. For the psychiatrist "may-in his own
mind-be defining 'likely' to mean anything from
virtual certainty to slightly above chance. And his
definition will not be a reflection of any expertise, but
* * * of his own personal preference for safety or liberty."
Of course, psychiatrists may be unable or unwilling
to provide a precise numerical estimate of probabil-
ities, and we are not attempting to so limit their
testimony. But questioning can and should bring
out the expert witnes!'s meaning when he testifies
that expected harm is or is not "likely." Only when
this has been done can the court properly separate
the factual question-what degree of likelihood ex-
ists in a particular case-from the legal
one*-whether the degree of likelihood that has been
found to exist provides a justification for commit-
ment.
T7
It is also significant that in the insanity defense
context, the diagnosis of sociopath-once thought
to imply too much rationality and too little com-
pulsion to warrant mitigating treatment-is 'in-
creasingly thought- to present a challenge to the
presumption of responsibility which only the jury
74 Id at 458. The modification of the Washington rule
in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1972) eliminates the prohibition of "ultimate fact" testi-
mony, but in no way reflects a diminished concern that
the proper role of the jury be maintained; under existing
procedures, the court is to make it clear to the jury, by its
instructions, that "[tihe experts add to perspective, with-
out giving decision. The law looks to the experts for
input, and to the jury for outcome." Id at 1007.7s See 471 F.2d at 1006-07.




may resolve. The Ninth Circuit has held, in a case
involving testimony by a government witness that
the defendant was a sociopath who could distin-
guish criminal and legal conduct, but could not
"appreciate the morality of his conduct,, 77 that the
trial judge committed reversible error in failing to
instruct the jury that " ... for purposes of the
insanity defense, 'wrongfulness' means moral
wrongfulness rather than criminal wrongfulness. "
78
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has held that the
diagnosis that a defendant "is an Antisocial Per-
sonality and was so at the time of the alleged
offenses, at which times he was able to appreciate
the criminality of his act, but he was not able to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law,"79 is evidence which entitles the defendant to
take the question of insanity to ajury.80 The Fourth
Circuit has also maintained that "[tihere is enough
doubt about a sociopath ... to call for an exercise
of the jury's moral judgments."8' Finally, appellate
77 United States v. Fresonke, 549 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th
Cir. 1977) (quoting the testimony of Dr. H. Kaufman, a
psychiatrist who testified as an expert witness for the
Government).
7 id.
7 United States v. McGirr, 434 F.2d 844, 846 (4th Cir
1970).
80 Id. at 849. The conviction was reversed because the
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in light of
the diagnosis had been denied. The psychiatric report
stated:
The patient did state that he felt that he was not
able to control the actions leading up to the com-
mission of this crime and although this is said with
the same glib facile manner, nonetheless the staff is
of the opinion that he is correct that the commission
of these crimes is part and parcel of his sociopathic
personality. He will so be reported to the Court.
Id. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, the examining agency, had
decided in 1957 "to treat sociopathic personality disturb-
ance as a mental illness." United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969, 1017 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
Si United States v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 459, 463 (4th Cir.
1968). The evidence here was reminiscent of that typi-
cally presented in a Texas capital sentencing proceeding
with, of course, conclusions of blameworthiness rather
than dangerousness. Significantly, Judge Sobeloff said,
dissenting from affirmance of the conviction and the jury
determination that the defendant was not legally insane:
When psychiatrist and counsel fail to provide suffi-
cient underlying information to the jury, the judge,
I maintain, has some responsibility to help elicit this
vital information. Although ours is indeed an ad-
versary system, a criminal trial is not a game. It is
a solemn proceeding in which moral judgment is
pronounced. As the governor of the trial, and not a
mere moderator, the judge has an affirmative duty
to do all that is feasible to assure that these judg-
ments are based upon all the relevant evidence. The
opinions affirming convictions of diagnosed socio-
paths occasionally have expressed, however indi-
judge should not hesitate to prevent the distortion
of the jury's perspective by counsel's deficient explo-
ration of the underlying, determinative facts. In
some cases, the court may feel obligated to suggest
that additional witnesses be called. At the very least
it should ensure that the psychiatrists who do testify
describe the investigations, observations, reasoning
and medical theory which led to the ultimate opin-
ion, as voiced on the witness stand.
Professor McCormick has declared that the
"core" of the opinion evidence rule would be pre-
served by a rule "prescribing that the trial judge in
his discretion may require that a witness before
giving testimony in terms of inference on general
description shall first give the concrete details upon
which the inference or description is founded, so far
as feasible." The need for judicial supervision is
particularly urgent in insanity cases, where the ad-
versary system may malfunction because of the
inexperience of counsel, the complexity of the issue,
or both. Most criminal defendants are represented
by court-appointed lawyers with little experience in
criminal law or even other areas of trial work. These
lawyers must master new fields of law and new
skills. When, in addition, it becomes their task to
present a defense of insanity, which involves elusive
medical, legal and moral problems,.they are often
understandably overwhelmed. In these circum-
stances, intervention from the bench may be abso-
lutely essential for a fair trial.
In the instant case, the trial judge did play more
than a passive role. On several occasions he com-
mendably required the expert witness to clarify his
opinions. But he never demanded that the psychi-
atrist present the factual basis for his opinions. Thus
the jury never obtained a complete unfolding of
defendant's emotional and mental processes. If they
had, they might have acquitted by reason of insan-
ity.
Id. at 465 (footnotes omitted). The opinion of the court
further commented upon the "factual sparsity of the
record," id. at 462, indicating that had the trial occurred
after the more recent announcement of judicial rules for
the presentation of psychiatric testimony on the issue of
sanity, it would have remanded "for a retrial on the issue
of mental responsibility." Id.
[Tihe expert witness was allowed and encouraged
to state his conclusionary appraisal of the defendant.
Conclusionary answers were given to questions
which called for them and which, most frequently,
were attempted to be cast in terms of ultimate
inferences. 'Does the defendant know the difference
between right and wrong?' 'Has he the capacity to
refrain from doing what he wants to do if he wants
very much to do it?' These are summary para-
phrases of a barrage of questions that ultimately
elicited in considerable detail the psychiatrist's sum-
mary description of the defendant. No one, however,
asked the witness about the bases of hisjudgment....
The deficiencies of the record here seemingly result
from an elementary preference for the unexamined
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rectly, a mix of reservations about the verdict and
speculation that it was dictated by the form of the
legal test or of the expert testimony.
2
There is at least one case of acquittal despite a
finding of sociopathy:
The report of the psychiatrist representing the court
was, with the consent of the prosecution and the
defense, admitted into evidence. In it he said, "On
the basis of the existing Maryland law, this patient
must be considered a responsible agent, since he has
the capacity to distinguish right from wrong and to
realize the consequences of his act. Yet, he has not
even the ability to conform to society's demands
that many insane individuals possess."
The defense psychiatrists all maintained that he
did not know right from wrong. Following some-
what the line of reasoning of Jerome Hall, a distin-
guished American law professor, they asserted that
knowing did not denote intellectual cognition alone
but included an ability to make use of such knowl-
edge. Being greatly affected by the tragedy of the
youth's aged parents and having the court's assur-
ance in answer to a specific question of the foreman
that on no condition would he be at large to prey
upon the community, the jury found him not guilty
by reason of insanity. This was the first instance in
Maryland law in which a psychopath was found
not guilty by reason of insanity. As such, it attracted
attention even outside the state. The Baltimore Sun
called it a victory for the common sense of the jury
in that it disregarded the "peculiarly backward
definition of insanity" under Maryland law and
brought "the definition into full accord with the
latest findings of psychiatry.
'"
conclusions of the expert witness over their factual
predicates. It was only by happenstance that the
witness testified that there was very little violence
in Wilson's history, and the paucity of other basic
information is proclaimed by the fact that we know
nothing else about him except that he was forty-six
years old, white and divorced. The doctor testified
that Wilson had been a failure in everything he ever
attempted, but the jury and we know nothing of
anything Wilson ever attempted except marriage,
and that is entirely unelucidated.
Id.
8 See note 81 supra; Apgar v. United States, 440 F.2d
733, 734 (8th Cir. 1971) ("we feel compelled to say that
... [the defendant's] life ... demonstrates the tragically
inadequate response of our institutions-mental, penal
and judicial-to an individual whose acts, time and
again, constituted a plea for assistance to overcome severe
personal inadequacies"); Adams v. United States, 413
F.2d 411, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ('whatever evil may be,
it is uncommonly difficult to discover it in the squalid
life of this man").
83 M. GU'I-MACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 47,
at 98-99.
And, the McCords have reported a case in which
the Governor of Maryland, "question[ing] the va-
lidity of sentencing a man because of a prediction
concerning his peril to society," 4 commuted the
sentence of a sociopath condemned to die.ss
Two conclusions may be drawn from these cases
involving similar decisionmaking or similarly di-
agnosed criminal defendants. The first is that a fair
hearing on a question which involves a measure-
ment of culpability requires that the factfinder be
given all "data relevant to blameworthiness" s and
bolstered against reliance upon conclusory expert
testimony which fosters the delegation of its role to
the psychiatric expert. The second is that the very
diagnosis which has led to the condemnation of
Texas capital defendants may be deemed mitigat-
ing where decisions are free of rigid formulae (so-
ciopath = not psychotic = able to distinguish
right and wrong = able to conform to the require-
ments of law) and decisionmakers are able to see
the data, and the individual, behind the labels.
Texas has traditionally thought sentencing judg-
ments best made byjuries.87 It has, moreover, been
on guard lest the proper role of the jury be usurped
by psychiatric experts
8 W. MCCORD &J. McCORD, supra note 48, at 200.
85 The sentencing judge had said:
[The defendant] is a mentally abnormal person, and
I knew him to be so when I sentenced him to hauig.
There is something very ugly about that bald state-
ment. Even a judge who believes in capital punish-
ment would hesitate a long time before he imposed
the death sentence upon a person known to be
mentally irresponsible. I do not believe in caiital
punishment ... society confesses its own failure
every time it exacts a life for a life.
Id. at 174.
The Governor (Albert C. Ritchie) had this response:
What I cannot understand is how the Court could
first decide-as it did-that [the defendant's] men-
tal disorder should be considered in mitigation of
punishment, and that he should not be hanged; and
then sentence him to be hanged anyhow, not for his
crime, but because the penitentiary is the only place
to which he could be committed.
Id.
The McCords themselves said, of the execution of
sociopaths, that "[s]ince execution precludes the possibil-
ity of better treatment, spontaneous 'conversion,' or cor-
recting mistaken diagnoses, it hardly seems ajust solution
to society's problem." Id. at 188-89.
' Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d at 447.
8 The first legislature of the State of Texas passed a
statute requiring that the jury assess punishment in crim-
inal cases (1 Laws of Texas 161 (Gammel 1898)); the
practice has not been significantly altered. See LaFont,
Assessment of Punishment-A judge orJuy Function?, 38 T-x.
L. REv. 835 (1960).
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The conclusion to be reached in matters of this sort
is for the jury. It is not the province of an expert to
give his opinion as to how a party accused of crime
shall be punished in case of a conviction. He may
say that the party is sane or insane, but it has not
been held, nor do we believe it could be rightfully
held, that the expert could express his opinion as to
the amount of punishment that the jury should
assess in case they found that the accused was not
insane.s
Yet, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has met
the charge that psychiatric testimony of the kind
typically used by the State in capital sentencings
was "speculative and constituted an invasion of the
province of the jury" with the response that: "[t]he
judge, on the basis of common knowledge, im-
pliedly found that the behavior patterns of a socio-
path were beyond the knowledge of laymen and
that the witness' knowledge and experience in this
field would assist the jury. The evidence was
properly admitted." 9 The court did not consider
the relevancy of sociopathy to the questions before
the jury, nor did it exhibit any inclination to
articulate standards to assure that the expert testi-
mony would inform rather than dictate the judg-
ment.90
One can advance compelling justifications for
permitting conclusory expert testimony and for
permitting expert testimony as to the ultimate fact
at issue.9t But there is a constitutional need to
m Duke v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 441,444, 134 S.W. 705,
707 (1911). See also State v. Nickens, 403 S.W.2d 582, 587
(Mo. 1966).
89 See Battie v. State, 531 S.W.2d at 407. See also Moore
v. State, 542 S.W.2d at 676.
90 The only hint the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has given that it disfavors the form and effect of psychi-
atric evidence of this kind in capital sentencing is its
statement in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
presented in Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977), to support a death sentence. The court stated
that "[wie find the facts adduced at the guilt stage of the
trial in the instant case to furnish greater probative
evidence to support the jury's answer than an opinion
which may be gleaned by a brief psychiatric examina-
tion." Id. at 280.
91 See FED. B. EvID. 704, Notes of Advisory Committee
on Proposed Rules (1975).
assure that the Texas capital sentencing jury will
understand and exercise its discretion to "consider
... not only why a death sentence should be im-
posed, but why it should not be imposed."' ' It
would seem, therefore, that courts supervising the
Texas capital sentencing process have "an affirm-
ative duty to do all that is feasible to assure that
these judgments are based upon all the relevant
evidence,"93 and that the life-death decision rests,
de facto, with "twelve lay representatives of the
community."94 Texas courts have taken no step to
control the impact of conclusory psychiatric testi-
mony. Moreover, the jury is not told of its authority
to respond to mitigating evidence but sworn to
objectivity. 95 The terms defining the concept dan-
gerousness have not been narrowed to exclude even
trivial threats or remote possibilities.96 The trial
judge has discretion to exclude apparently relevant
mitigating evidence,97 and the sufficiency of the
evidence of dangerousness is, as a rule, unre-
viewed.98
Professor Dix has suggested that the psychiatric
profession has an obligation in situations of this
kind to insist that the jury not listen to its expertise
without a frank statement of psychiatric limita-
tions.99 The circumstances surrounding and exac-
erbating the problem of the expert who appears,
but is not qualified (1) to know what dangerousness
is'0° and (2) to identify it,' 01 suggest a legal remedy
as well. They suggest that the Texas death penalty
laws have failed in their operation to allow those
meaningful considerations of particularized miti-
gating circumstances 102 which are "a constitution-
ally indispensable part of the process of inflicting
the penalty of death. ' 0
'2 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 271.
93 U.S. v. Wilson, 399 F.2d at 465 (Sobeloff, J., dis-
senting).
9' Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d at 454.5 See note 40, supra and accompanying text.
96 See notes 30-39, supra and accompanying text.97 See notes 24-31, supra and accompanying text.
9 See note 31, supra and accompanying text.
"Dix, supra note 16, at 151.
'0o See notes 30-39, supra and accompanying text.
101 See notes 41-45, supra and accompanying text.
102Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 272.
10a Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304.
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